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Perpetual Injustice: The 20 Year Battle for Reparations in Peru
by Aida Faverio* and Anna Naimark**
IntroductIon
More than twenty years since the Peruvian government responded to the threat of terrorism by arresting, detaining, and torturing its own citizens, falsely 
accused as terrorists, many of those who were acquitted or 
pardoned have yet to receive moral or economic reparations.1 
Despite the acknowledgement of the violations by the state, the 
conviction of then-President Alberto Fujimori for human rights 
violations, and the determination that victims are due repara-
tions, the failure to provide these reparations, as required by 
international law, makes the violations ongoing, creating ripple 
effects and perpetuating the suffering of these individuals.
Background
Between 1980 and 2000, two domestic terrorist groups 
plagued Peru: Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) and Movimiento 
Revolucionario Túpac Amaru (the Túpac Amaru Revolutionary 
Movement, MRTA). The Shining Path was especially powerful 
and its leader, Abimael Guzmán, was a communist professor of 
philosophy who was inspired by Mao Zedong and the Cultural 
Revolution in China. Guzman based the Shining Path’s fighting 
style on the strategies Mao employed in China’s “People’s War.” 
The core of the strategy was to mobilize agrarian societies to 
revolt and then encircle large cities, eventually toppling them. 
Using this style, the Senderos (members of the Shining Path) 
would expel government forces and create “liberated zones.” 
Because Guzmán’s strategy imitated Mao’s, the guerilla war 
was fought primarily in the Peruvian countryside and gradually 
choked off the big cities, with the main target being Lima, 
the capital.2
As the internal conflict strengthened, the state consolidated 
its power, and mobilized military forces to begin fighting back. 
In the 1990s, then-President Alberto Fujimori carried out an 
auto-coup d’état by abolishing the Peruvian Congress with 
Decree Law 25418. Decree Law 25418 transferred the legislative 
powers to the Executive Branch of the government and also 
abolished much of the Constitution.3 Decree Laws 25422, 
25423, and 25244 removed all the members of the Tribunal 
of Constitutional Guarantees, thirteen judges of the Supreme 
Court of Justice, and all the members of the National Council 
of Judges and the District Councils of Judges from office.4 On 
April 23, 1992, the government removed an additional 120 
judges and public prosecutors with Decree Law 25446.5 With 
the elimination of these foundations and the balance of power, 
Fujimori was able to enact several reforms and apply drastic 
punishments to those presumed to be members of designated 
terrorist groups—the Shining Path and the MRTA.
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), estab-
lished on July 13, 2001, to investigate human rights violations 
attributable to the state, the Shining Path, and the MRTA 
between 1980 and 2000, found that as a part of Fujimori’s anti-
terrorism campaign, unsuspecting and innocent civilians were 
arrested and subjected to a variety of torturous acts to obtain 
information regarding the terrorist groups without access to due 
process through a legitimate court system.
The campaign to fight terrorism began with arbitrary 
detentions of mainly campesinos, or people from rural areas, 
on the outskirts of the city. Many civilians were accused of 
being terrorists or materially supporting terrorists. Raids on 
small villages often ended in deaths and/or violent attacks. The 
Colina Group, an extrajudicial “anti-communist death squad” 
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carried out the most infamous of these raids—the La Cantuta 
massacre and the Barrios Altos massacre—under Fujimori’s 
orders. The La Cantuta massacre involved the kidnapping, 
disappearance, and assassination of nine students and a professor 
from La Cantuta University on July 18, 1992.6 The Barrios 
Altos massacre involved the execution of fourteen adults and 
an eight-year-old boy in Lima’s Barrios Altos neighborhood on 
November 3, 1991. The TRC found that between 1980 and 2000, 
more than 69,280 persons were killed or forcibly disappeared.7 
This number reflects not only those killed by the government, 
but also those killed by the Shining Path and the MRTA. Those 
killed in the conflict comprise a greater number of human 
losses suffered by Peru than all of 
the wars that have occurred in its 182 
years of independence. It is also more 
than double the combined estimated 
totals of those killed in the dirty war 
in Argentina (30,000) and during 
the dictatorship of General Augusto 
Pinochet in Chile (3,000).8
Even when judicial processes were 
utilized, they were grossly defective. 
A commission of international lawyers 
charged with evaluating the Peruvian 
judiciary during the Fujimori regime 
called the judicial system’s treatment of 
those charged with treason or terrorism 
“seriously flawed and at odds in many 
key respects with Peru’s international 
legal obligations.”9 An investigation 
conducted by the Instituto de Defensa 
Legal (Institute of Legal Defense, IDL), 
a prominent human rights organization 
in Peru, found that the judiciary issued 51,684 warrants for 
12,858 people.10 Moreover, because Peru has many common 
names, warrants require additional identifiers such as parents’ 
names, a physical description, and the age of the person, 
otherwise they are unlawful.11 In the warrants put forth under 
Fujimori, however, 89.1 percent did not include parents’ names, 
86.3 percent did not specify physical characteristics, and 
79.2 percent did not include the age of the person to be 
arrested.12 Despite a lack of credible statistics concerning how 
many innocent people the government arrested, the number of 
warrants issued and the lack of specific identifiers on these 
warrants indicates that there may have been thousands.
Many of those who were arrested were not given a trial. 
Those who were given a hearing had to go before a “faceless 
tribunal” where the judges would not show their faces, would 
distort their voices, and would not sign the judgments, allegedly 
out of fear of revenge by the terrorists. This made it impossible 
to know whether the judges had proper legal training, much less 
if they were providing a fair trial. Moreover, the accused were 
given limited legal representation and the evidence needed to 
convict and sentence the accused was minimal and was often 
falsified or uncorroborated.13 Despite the revocation of the 
“faceless judge” provision in October 1997,14 Human Rights 
Watch reported that thousands were incarcerated as a result of 
this measure and that, in some jurisdictions, up to forty percent 
of the convicted were later found innocent.15
Once imprisoned, the alleged terrorists were subjected to 
torture, some over the course of years. Many were held incom-
municado, cut off from family, friends, and any semblance of 
human contact. The treatment that they received was undisputedly 
cruel, inhuman, and degrading.
Inadequate RepaRatIons and the FoRmatIon oF aRIL
After nearly a decade of international pressure, Peru created 
an Ad Hoc Commission on August 17, 1996, pursuant to Decree 
Law 26655, to grant judicial pardons to those who had been 
unjustly convicted or processed for the crimes of terrorism 
or treason.16 President Fujimori, the Ombudsman, and the 
Minister of Justice all supported the 
Commission.
In order to adjudicate the pardons, 
the Commission would have to receive 
a request for a pardon and then would 
gather information and evidence 
regarding the cases, and then evaluate 
the cases. If the cases qualified, the 
Commission would then send the 
requests to the President to grant the 
pardon. According to the IDL, Fujimori 
pardoned 515 persons falsely convicted 
of terrorism and treason.17
Despite government efforts to 
address the imprisonment of innocent 
civilians, many of the affected individu-
als did not ultimately receive or benefit 
from the pardons. Others who were 
unjustly incarcerated or accused were 
then either acquitted or never officially 
convicted of either terrorism or treason. Both those whom 
Fujimori pardoned and those whom the courts acquitted continue 
to have the charges or convictions on their permanent criminal 
records. Because these are incomplete pardons and acquit-
tals, the individuals’ tainted records make them second-class 
citizens. The records label them “terrorists,” which generates 
severe stigmatization and prevents them from obtaining employ-
ment or accessing educational opportunities.
After years of being subjected to arbitrary detentions, torture, 
and violations of due process, and advocating for their right to 
reparations, some 300 pardoned and acquitted Peruvians came 
together to form the Asociación Reflexión de Inocentes Liberados 
(Reflection Association of Liberated Innocents, ARIL).
Unlike other groups of freed individuals, this group com-
prises both those who have been pardoned as well as those who 
have been acquitted. To them, the fight is one united effort.
the stRuggLe FoR JustIce
In its early jurisprudence, the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights (IACtHR, Court) established that the states’ 
duty to prevent future violations of human rights is essential for 
fulfilling the requirements to respect and ensure the exercise of 
fundamental rights as established in the American Convention 
on Human Rights.18 The reparation judgments are the main tool 
In its early jurisprudence, 
the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights established 
that the states’ duty to prevent 
future violations of human 
rights is essential for fulfilling 
the requirements to respect 
and ensure the exercise 
of fundamental rights as 
established in the American 
Convention on Human Rights.
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that the Court has to compel Member States to comply with this 
duty.19 In consistent jurisprudence, the IACtHR has established 
that it is a principle of international law that “any violation of 
an international obligation resulting in damage gives rise to 
the new obligation to remedy [that] damage.”20 The state must 
give the survivors of atrocities remedies that are “in accordance 
with the rules of due process of law” and are both adequate and 
effective.21 In order to be considered adequate, the domestic 
remedies must address the infringement of the legal right. To 
be effective, the remedy must be 
capable of producing the intended 
result.22 The responsible state cannot 
invoke provisions of domestic law 
to modify or fail to comply with the 
obligation to provide reparations, 
because all aspects are regulated by 
international law.” 23
The Constitutional Court of 
Peru, using guidance from the juris-
prudence of the Inter-American 
System of Human Rights (IASHR), 
affirmed the right to a remedy from 
a competent court in the face of any act or omission that harms 
fundamental rights.24 This right was elaborated in Velásquez-
Rodríguez v. Honduras, when the Court became the first human 
rights tribunal to require a state to “prevent, investigate and 
punish any violation of the rights . . . [and] attempt to restore 
the right violated and provide compensation as warranted for 
damages resulting from the violation.”25 These remedies, known 
collectively as reparations, refer to the economic and moral 
reparations, which the violating state is responsible for providing 
to the victims under the American Convention. Economic 
reparations are money rewards for actual damages or pecuniary 
rewards.26 Moral reparations are designed as restitution for 
damages that cannot be quantified and are public acts or works 
that aim to restore dignity to the victims and their families 
and publicly condemn the human rights violations in question 
to prevent their recurrence.27
In order to fulfill these obligations, the Peruvian government 
enacted Decree Law 28952, which created the Integral Plan of 
Reparations (Plan Integral de Reparaciones, PIR), to give those 
who have been pardoned adequate reparations.28 However, the 
plan excluded those who were acquitted before being convicted, 
despite having suffered similar violations to those who were 
pardoned. Under the PIR, acquitted individuals do not qualify 
for monetary compensation because it is assumed 
that they did not suffer the same prison condi-
tions or loss of livelihood as those who served 
prison terms. The state failed to give even those 
who qualified for the reparations as pardoned 
individuals their reparations, claiming that it 
lacked funding.
For years, the members of ARIL have been 
struggling to have their voices heard within 
the judicial system. Despite the democratization 
of the government and the international legal 
right to reparation they have in theory, in prac-
tice, members of ARIL have not received any 
compensation. In order to gain access to reparations, the 
indultados, or pardoned, must file for them in domestic court. 
The ARIL members complied with this process but were 
denied access to reparations when judges dismissed their 
claims because they could not afford to pay the necessary fees. 
They were incapable of doing so because they live in poverty 
as result of the violations they suffered. In essence, one of the 
reasons they need the reparations, for economic stability, is the 
same reason that they are denied it. The courts do theoretically 
provide fee waivers, but they 
have denied ARIL’s requests for 
them. The ARIL members’ lack of 
resources has thus been an impas-
sible hurdle. Ultimately, the state is 
not living up to obligations under 
its “duty to repair” because ARIL 
members do not have an effective 
route to obtain these reparations, 
which is a fundamental tenet of the 
state’s duty.29
Far from being “repaired” to the 
state of their lives before they were 
swept up in the conflict, even the one reparation some members 
of ARIL were given has caused them to struggle. The govern-
ment gave pardoned members of ARIL a desolate plot of land in 
Huachipa, about an hour outside of the capital city and situated 
in the middle of three factories, as a reparation, but the grant 
was realistically a tool used by the state to get the group to cease 
its requests for further redress. The members of ARIL call this a 
“self-reparation” because, after they were granted the land, they 
had to fight to use it. First, ARIL members had to fight military 
officials in charge of the munitions factory that borders the plot 
for rights to the land. Then, after they won a smaller piece of 
the land from what the original reparation granted, they were 
told they could not build on it until there were environmental 
tests that showed the land was safe to live on. ARIL members 
then conducted the necessary environmental tests at their own 
expense. After they were finally approved to build on the land, 
they had to finance the infrastructure on the arid plot. The 
land at Huachipa has a nonfunctional sewage system, no water 
supply, and the homes are not structurally secure. The greatest 
irony of their “self-reparation,” members note, is that they must 
live as neighbors with the military, the same institution that 
Fujimori used to torture them and deny them of their basic 
human rights for years.30
Ultimately, the state is not living 
up to obligations under its “duty 
to repair” because ARIL members 
do not have an effective route to 
obtain … reparations, which is a 
fundamental tenet of the state’s duty.
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The members of ARIL not only suffer from memories of the 
past but also continue to suffer from the ongoing stigmatization 
of being branded as terrorists. Despite the fact that they have 
been pardoned or acquitted and were never involved in acts of 
terrorism, being associated with the Senderos and the MRTA 
haunts their daily lives. Marred with criminal records, these 
individuals have trouble accessing employment. Some of the 
members were isolated from their families after being labeled 
as terrorists and have had trouble reestablishing a sense of com-
munity. The members’ names appear published as “terrorists” 
in newspapers, leading to threats and personal insecurity. They 
face this social and economic isolation in addition to the many 
ailments that result from being subjected to torture. Many of 
the individuals live with post-traumatic stress disorders and 
physical ailments from the many years of torture they endured. 
They suffered a loss of livelihood, family life, security, economic 
opportunities, homes, crops, businesses, community involve-
ment, and virtually everything a person values and needs for 
basic adequate subsistence. They suffer this because they were 
mistaken as terrorists, something the Peruvian government 
recognized its responsibility for, yet has failed to redress.
The years of detention the members of ARIL suffered involving 
cruel, inhumane, and degrading treatment by the Peruvian 
government have ended, but the violation of their human rights 
has not. They remain stigmatized by the state’s false accusations 
of terrorism and treason. Moreover, because of their history of 
oppression by the state, they cannot afford to gain access to 
the reparations they are due under the law. Unable to seek help 
domestically, ARIL looked to the Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights (IACHR) almost nine years ago and has yet to 
reach even the admissibility stage. The eight petitions they filed 
languish, and the justice they deserve is on hold as the IACHR 
tries to process 8,500 other pending cases.31
ConClusion
The members of ARIL have suffered a clear violation of 
international law by Peru. The IASHR has affirmed that where a 
country violates the rights of its citizens, those citizens are due 
adequate and effective reparations. The IASHR, as well as the 
government of Peru, has affirmed the violations and, therefore, 
Peru incurred this obligation to properly redress it. In order to 
do this, the state should give the members of ARIL reparations 
that will put them back to the position they were in before they 
were wrongfully accused of treason and terrorism, arbitrarily 
detained, and subjected to cruel and inhuman treatment. The 
IACtHR clarified the duty to provide restitution as a requirement 
of customary international law in numerous cases, including the 
Miguel Castro-Castro Prison v. Peru case.32 This requires both 
payments of economic reparations for years of life taken away 
from them, pain and suffering, and lost economic opportunities, 
as well as moral reparations that counter stigmatization with 
moral reparations to publically acknowledge the members of 
ARIL’s innocence. There is no way to completely repair the life 
of someone who has suffered so greatly at the hands of a state 
actor, but Peru has not even come close to fulfilling their obliga-
tions to attempt an adequate reparation.
Photo courtesy of the authors
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